Abstract: Computer-mediated interaction on the Internet provides new opportunities to examine the links between reputation, risk, and the development of trust between individuals who engage in various types of exchange. In this article , we comment on the application of experimental sociological research to d ifferent t ypes of Computermediated social interactions, with particular attention to the emergence of what we call 'trust networks' (networks of those one views as trustworthy). Drawing on the existing categorization systems that have been used in experimental social psychology, we relate the various forms of computer-mediated exchange to selected findings from experimental research. We develop a simple typology based on t he intersection of random versus fixed-partner soc ial dilemma games, and repeated versus one-shot interaction situations. By crossing these two types of sod a l dilemma games and two types of inte raction situations, we show that many forms of Internet exchange can be categorized effectively into four mutually exclusive categories. The resulting classification system helps to integrate the existing research on t rust in exp erim ent al social psychology with the ernerging field of computer-mediated exchange.
Introduction
We investigate recent experimental work on social exch ange networks, un cert ainty, commitment and trust to analyze ernerging for ms of social interaction that are mediated by Computers including systems like t h e Internet t hat link p eople across the globe. In particular we examine different types of exchange n etworks and the role of reputa tions a nd trust in these networks, commenting on the a pplication of this research to various types of computer-mediated social interaction. We focus attention on the emergence of what we call 'trust networks' (Cook/Rice/Gerbasi forthcoming) t o resolve some of t he difficulties involved in anonymous exchanges of different types of goods and services. Trust networks are the egocentric n etworks of those on e views as trustworth y.
Computer-mediated exchange allows individuals t o exchange with various degrees of a nonymity through elec tronic networks . Since anonymity cr eates uncertainty a nd risk , resolv ing this uncertainty and d evelopin g ways to avoid r isk are central to creating ongoing exchange environments. A lth ough r eputation systems are sh own to b e a well-supported solution to the inheren t uncer tainty and risk in this type of exchange situation, we conclude t h at reput ation systems are only on e m echanism for attempting t o secure trustworth iness and reliability. We comment on other m echanism s that have been developed in effor ts t o ensure reliability, particularly when re putation information is not available.
To understand the emergence of trust networks in comp uter-mediated communication settings such as those on the Internet, we develop a t y p ology based on the intersection of random versus fixed-partner social d ilemma games, and repeated versus one-shot interaction situations. By crossing these two t y pes of social dilemma games and two types of interaction sit uations, we show t hat many forms of Internet exchange can be categorized effec tively into four m ut ually exclusive categories. Since similar categorization systems hav e been used in experimental social psychology, we relate the various forms of comp uter-mediated exchange to the selected findings from experimental research. We begin with a review of the pertinent findings from experimental social psychology on un certainty and commitment in exchange relations.
Uncertainty and Commitment in Exchange Networks
Experimental research on exchange relations in social networks indicates t hat under varying degrees of uncertainty actors begin to form commit ment s t o t heir exchange partners when they b elieve there is risk in t he env ironment , t ypically the risk of exploitation (i.e., Cook/ Emerson 1978; Kollock 1999a; Ya magishi/ Matsuda 2003; and Rice unpublished) . This is a form of inter personal commitment even though the act ors m ay know v ery little a b out each oth er except their own history of exchange r evealed over time through their interactions. This b e havioral history a nd its veracity may b e the most import ant source of reputa tion in ne tworks of mediated interaction.
Uncertainty concerning the quality of the goods at stake is one r eason for commitment formation. Whe n a buyer finds a supplier who is reliably trustworthy in te rms of providing goods of high qu ality the buyer may t ry to enter a committed relationship with tha t partic ula r seller. As K ollock's (1994) experimental r esearch su ggests those who locate pa rtners wh o a r e trust worth y t end to form committed relations. In market s w her e quality can be d eterm in ed m ore easily by the buyer (as is t he case with the rice ma rket , unlike the ru bber market) actor s are less likely to form commitments a nd thus they rem ain op en to n ew excha nge p a rtners . Cook/ Rice/G erbasi (forthcoming) explor e t h e consequ en ces of commitment formation a nd the e mergence of trust networ ks for t h e t ransition to open m a rket economies.
In Kollock's (1994) study of opportunistic uncertainty and commit men t, actor s exchanged goods in two differ ent env ironme nts. In one env ironment (low unce rtainty) the true value of the goods b eing exchanged was known, while in the other (high uncertainty) e nvironment the true value of goods was with held u nt il the end of the n egotiation s. Actors h ad a great er tendency to form commitments in the highe r uncertainty environment. They chose t o continue to t ra n sact with the partners w ho had esta blished their t rustworthiness by not misrepresenting the value of their go ods rather tha n to en gage in potent ially m ore pr ofitable exch a nges with n ew, untest ed partner s.
Yamagishi/ Cook/ Wa tabe (1 998) further explored the conn ection b etween u ncertainty and commitment. In their exp eriment, ac tors wer e faced wit h t h e d e-cision of remaining with a given partner or entering a pool of unknown potential partners. They employed several modifications of this basic experimental design, but in each instance the expected value of exchangeoutside the ex ist ing r elation was higher than the returns from the current relation. They found that actors were willing to incur sizeable opportunity costs to reduce t he risks associated with opportunism. M oreover, they found that uncertainty in either t he for m of an uncertain probability of loss or an unknown size of loss promoted comm itment between exchange partners.
Given high levels of uncertainty in most systems of Internet t rade, commitments are likely to form in markets for certain types of goods and services. The most problematic trades for buyers are the one-shot interactions in which either there is no need for a repeat trade in the near fu t ure or it is unlikely t hat the actors involved would ever engage in repeat trade for a number of r easons (unrelated to the type of good or service involved).
The Emergence of Trust Networks under Uncertainty
Our r esearch indica tes tha t commitments tend to for m under uncertainty and tha t trust is high er among those who dev elop such b eh avioral commitmen ts. However, it is also clear in our research tha t when trust is measured as a n indep endent va riable (as a predisposing factor) high t rusters and low t r uster s tend to b eha ve diffe rently in the same environments . U nder high uncer tainty it is the low trust ers who a r e the quiekest to form interpersonal com mitmen ts. High truste rs are mor e likely to b e risk ta kers and to remain in the 'm a rket' for n ew part ne rs longe r. In our most recent cross-cultural study of trust forma tion in t h e U.S. and J a p a n, w e find that cooperation a mong individuals is significantly high er wh en individuals are given t he opportunity t o h ave r ep eat interactions w it h t h e sam e p art ner s instead of b eing ra ndomly paired with p a rtners (Co ok et al. forthcom ing). In these exp eriments , individuals a r e given the ability t o 1) contr ol how m uch to entrust t o a pa r t n er a nd, 2) decide wh ether to coop erate wit h the part ner by returning (or not r eturning) the a mount tha t was entrusted t o them. Whe n indiv iduals only ma ke a d ecision a b out whether t o r eturn coins or n ot (an d the a mount is d ecided by the computer) , we consider this to be a basic prisoner's dilemma . When individuals h ave both of these choices, however , we call t h is a PD/ R ga m e, or, a prisoner's dilemma with risk. We found t h at p a rticipants significa ntly entrust ed more money in the PD/ R game (see F igure 1) a nd t h eir coop er ation rates were high er (see Figure 2 ) when t hey were paired with fixed partner s instead of random p a rtners (Cook et al. forthcoming) . In t h e sam e stu dy, we also examined t he effect of signaling t rust wh en m atched w ith r a ndom p a rtne rs . Thus, we r a ndomly match ed p a rt ner s on every t r ial of the exp eriment, and in on e situa tion individuals could con t r ol the amount to entrust to t h eir p a rtner s a nd in t h e oth er situation they could not control this a mount. We found tha t allowing indiv iduals to signal t heir t rustwor t h in ess seems to h ave a positive effect on coop eration , b ut t h is positive effect is minor and short-lived. In fact, the effect is not significantly stron ger t han in inte raction s b e tween random partners wh o cannot signal each oth er (Cook et al. forthcoming) . Furthermore, we found that there is no cross-cu lt ural differen ce in levels of cooper ation between American a nd the Japanese participants when they p a rticipate in r a ndom-partner exchange. In r eal-world situa tions in which trad e partners are often initially u nknown, h aving some system for establishing their trustworthiness is a primary con cern, especially in settings in which it would be easy to ch eat. Institut ion al backing, law and oth er devices for managing distrust or t h e breach of trust are crucial in the development of systems that manage t r ades, auctions and oth er forms of inter action involv ing the tra nsfer of goods, services and mon ey reliably. Computer-mediatedexchange on t he Internet, for example, is an environment in which trading a nd a uctions h ave flourish ed-despite concerns about a nonymity a nd the selection of trade partners at ra ndom initially. One r eason for the success of m a ny Internet excha n ge systems is t h at these systems h ave either adopted reputation syst ems, or such systems have evolved out of necessit y. In the following sections, we discuss the emergen ce of reputation systems and the condition s unde r w hich diffe rent t yp es of reputation systems are likely to work for m edia ted inter actions (i.e. Internet trades) . We also discuss alternatives to reputation systems, especially in exchange situations in which it is impractical or impossib le t o obtain reputation information. Yamagishi/ Matsuda (2003) demonstrate that the role of reputations varies depending upon whether the social system in which the actors are embedded is closed or open. In closed communities reputations can be effective because negative reputations can Iead to exclusion (Cook/ Hardin 2001) . In more open societies negative reputations are less effective because they are limited in the ext ent to which they are transferred t o all those in t he network ( or social system ) since information fiows only across those actors that are linked directly or indirectly. More importantly, actors can alter their identities in ways that make it easier to reenter trade networks without being recognized as having bad a negat ive reputation. The focus of Yamagishi/ Matsuda's (2003) experimental st udy is an Internet trading network in which both the Ievel of honesty in the trades and the price can be tracked. Positive--reputation mechanisms are more effective than negative--reput ation mechanisms in open networks. In both cases (positive and negative reputation conditions) actors are rated on t heir honest y and thus accumulate reputation points that are published in the network after each tra nsaction. In this research reputat ion mecha nisms are invest igat ed by Ya magishi and Matsuda (2003) as solutions to the 'lemons' problern in Int ernet markets, t hat is, the tendency for the goods on the market to be low quality especially when t here is asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. T ypically, the lemons market (Akerlof 1970) emerges when the buyers have much less valid or reliable information about the quality of the goods on the market than do the sellers ( as is frequently the case in the used car market). Buyers must rely on the repu-tation of the sellers to determine how much confidence they have in the seller (i.e. how trustworthy the seller is). In this world of trade Yamagishi and Matsuda (2003) demonstrate that the lemons problern is exacerbated when actors can change their identities and reenter the market with a new identity (thus canceling their negative reputation). They also demonstrate that positive reputations affect behavior differently since actors develop an investment in their reputations and want to protect them. Ttaders lose their positive reputation and their investment in it if they alter their identities. In fact, the negative reputation mechanism designed to reveal dishonest traders is particularly vulnerable to identity changes, whereas the positive reputation mechanism designed to identify honest traders is not so vulnerable to identity changes. The results concerning the quality of goods produced in settings using these two different reputation mechanisms (with and without the possibility of changing identities in the exchange network) are presented in Figure To test the prediction that positive reputation devices are more effective than negative reputation mechanisms, Yamagishi/Matsuda (2003) conducted one experiment in which the quality Ievel of the goods could be compared between exchange systems involving only positive or only negative reputations. The findings show that there is a significantly high er quality Ievel, at least initially, when the negative reputation mechanism is used. Yet, as negative reputations grow, so do the tendencies to create new identities to shed the old negative reputation and begin anew. The positive reputation device proved tobe better for producing higher quality goods in the long run when compared to a purely negative reputation system. Individuals became invested in their positive reputations.
The Role of Reputation Systems in Exchanges
The negative reputation device may work best under t he condition t hat someone who develops a negative reputation can be effectively excluded from trade by the group acting as a whole. This requires a closed network with information sharing. 1 Norms of exclusion work only in groups and are not effective in open networks. They function to eliminate those who have 'ch eated' from t he syst em of trade (Hardin 1995; Cook/Hardin 2001) . Kollock (1999a) views the auction houses that have been created for trade on the Internet as a laboratory for the study of the management of risk w hen t h ere is little or no access to external enforcement mechanisms (the t ypical way we manage risk). He studies the emergence of endogenous solutions to the problems of risky trade in cases in which no guarantees, warranties, or ot her t hird-party enforcement mechanisms exist. The reputation systems t hat emerge t o manage this risk are the primary focus of his research. Yamagishi and Matsuda (2003) explore the differences documented b y K ollock between negative and positive reputation systems. K ollock (1 999a, 111 ) not es that "a particularly disturbing strategy for fraud ... in a number of on line markets is the person who works hard at establishing a t rustw or t h y r eputation, and then sets up a whole series of significant trades and d efa u lts on all of them, disa ppearing into a new identity after the fact. " In a quantitative st ud y of a uctions on eBay, K ollock (1999a) provides eviden ce t h at at least for some high-value goods, the price buyers paid was positively a nd significan tly affected by the seller's reputa tion.
In a simula tion study of the effect s of p ositive reputation system s t h at are simila r in character to the p ositive r eputa tions studied experiment ally b y Yamagishi and Matsuda (2003) , Whitmeyer (2000, 196) finds t h at t h e effects of diffe rent types of positive r eputa tion syste ms d ep end t o a large extent on the proportion of co operators (as opposed to n on-co operators) in t he p opulation. He examines the effects of reputation systems on gen eral con fid ence gains in the societ y. If the proportion of non-coopera tors is low, a ny type of positive r eputation syst emwill work b ecause the non-coop erators will be m ore easily detected, esp ecially if it is hard to obtain a p ositive reputa tion. 2 If t he pr oportion of n oncoop erators is high , then a tough reputation syste m w ill m ean lost opp or t u nit ies for coop era tion b ecause some potential cooper a tors will not b e d etected.
A lternatives to Reputation Systems f or Securing Trustworthiness
In som e exchange systems, it is not possible to esta blish reputat ion inform ation, or it would a t least not b e feasible t o do so. If a n exchange syst em involves m any one-shot interactions between ra ndom pa rtners, it may n ot be p ossible to bu ild a r eputa tion ( or the obstacles associated with regula ting such a syst em m ay b e too great ) . In su ch cases, ther e m a y b e alternative types of m echanism s t h at em erge to prov ide s ecurity.
The exte nt t o which ther e is institutional backing for failed t rust is what matters most in these environments independent of the quality or veracity of the reputation information involved in the decision of whom to trade with (or bu y from), especially when such information is unreliable or impossible to obtain. For example, the Maghribi traders of the 11th century conducted t rades across the Mediterranean despite the high level of uncertainty about t h eir trading p artners and, ultimately, the quality of the goods being traded (Greif 1989; . D esp ite the incentives to cheat each other in these trades, the Maghribi were able to sustain successful trades. Greif (1989) explains this result by emphasizing the fact that the Maghribi traders were a ble to use closed networks t hat eliminated traders from their coalitions if they tried to cheat other traders. Com munity responsibility norms, as a kind of monitoring and policing device, developed as a way to secure trustworthiness within a circumscribed set of act ors. The social contexts in which exchanges are embedded are t hus crucial fo r understanding how trust and cooperation can develop, especially in the absen ce of reputation information. Social context refers to the n ature of t he sit u a tions in which social interactionstake place (Cook/Cooper 2003) . Fact ors such as group size and network density, for exa mple, ca n have an independent effect on the development of trust. Systems that are too large can reduce t h e effect t h at trust has on cooperative b eh avior (Sato 1988) . Furthermore, the ver y emergence of trust and cooperation may depend on lo cally embedded 'neighbor hoods' that act as the source of coopera tive a nd trusting b ehavior (Macy / Skvoret z 1998) .
Another important factor that affect s cooperation and the em ergen ce of t rust is the ability to communicate w ith partners. The ability t o communicate with one 's partner b efor e playing a n experimental social dilemma game h as a str ong effect on specific trust of one's partner (Mori 1996) . Other social con text variables h ave b een shown to affect levels of trust a nd cooperation, including time pressure, the presen ce of third parties, a nd culture. 3
lmplicat ions for the Internet and Other Forms of Comput er M ediate d Inte raction
Trust n etworks can ta ke several different forms in compute r-mediated interaction a nd on t h e Internet . Although the Internet is certainly t he largest Computermediated n etwork, we a r gue tha t the processes by w hich t r ustwor t h iness is established in such networks can be informed by the experimental work on trust (e.g ., D asgupta 1988; Kreps 1990; Snijders 1996; Berg/Dickha ut/ M cCabe 1995; Yamagishi/Kakiuchi 2000) . The experime ntal work in this tradition uses social d ilemma games (such as t h e dassie prisoner's dilemma) as tools for understanding the processes b y w hich trust and trustworthiness a re establish ed under condition s of risk and uncertainty. A simple social dilemmagamesuch as the prisoner's dilemma can be carried out as a on e-sh ot game (in w hich the participa nts interact on ly on e time), or as a rep eated / iterated game (in w hich the participa nts interact several times) . In addition, an iterated social dilemma game may have fixed partners (Le, the same partner on every turn), or random partners ( a new, random partner on every turn). Since one-shot games only involve one interaction, the fixed/random partner distinction doe.s not apply. Thus, the intersection of the.se two dimensions produce.s a 4-cell m atrix (with one em pty cell) which is useful for categorizing the various types of interaction situations found in the Internet environment. In the following sections, we describe the.se different types of interaction situations and some of the issue.s related to e.stablishing trustworthiness under varying conditions. Table 1 
Peer-to-Peer digital goods exchange
Online "pick-up" games (i.e., cardgames) i 4 We view this typology as a useful tool for discussing the many types of interactions that take place on the Internet, yet we acknowledge that many of the examples in our typology can, and often do, take on different forms ofinteraction depending on the situation. As a result, the examples arenot necessarily always one kind of interaction situation, nor do they always have fixed or random partners. It is precisely because of the malleability of interaction situations on the Internet that we find this kind of typology useful for describing any given situation.
One-Shot Interactions with Random Partners
In an experiment involving a one-shot situation with r and om partners, indiv iduals must simultaneously make decisions whether to cooperate. Because the interaction only occurs once ( or there is only one trial), b oth parties can either cooperate or not, but trust would rarely, if ever, emerge since t here wou ld be no repeat interactions. An act of cooperation in a one-shot situation can be v iewed as involving taking a risk, rather than as an act of 'trust' (see Hardin 2003) . In a one-shot game there is no ability to send a signal to the p artner by cooperating initially on several trials to signal trustworthiness. In computer-mediated communication, some types of Email interactionstake this on e-sh ot, random par t n er form.
For example, suppose a professor receives an email fr om a n un kn own person requesting an unpublished draft of a current resea rch paper. The pr ofessor does not know the person, so how does she know if the person is n ot going to plagiarize the paper, or quote it against the wishes of t he a ut hor? A d iffere nt example of this sort of uncertainty exists when an individual receives a n em ail from an unknown person with an attached file. How does t he r ecipient kn ow tha t the attachment is not a computer virus? In both situations, social context cues (Sproull/ Kiesle r 1986) such as the email address of the sen der ca n b ecome essential to establishing trustwort hiness. Ifwe assume that the r ecipien t d oes n ot know the sende r, then seemingly trivial things like the d omain of t h e sender (e.g., .edu, .com), the lack or presen ce of a p ersonalized address in the email or t h e t one of the message can have a profound influence on the r esp onse of the r ecipient. In the absence of personal reputation information, such cu es act as a proxy for reputation information when attempting t o establish the t rustwor t hiness of on e's partner (see also Gambetta/Hamill forthcoming) .
Iterated Interactions with Random Partners
Computer-media t ed interactions on the Internet that involve itera t ed inter actions give participant s multiple ch a nces to coop er ate w ith t heir partners. However , if the inte raction s a re always w ith new partners som etimes selected at random, then it is not p ossible to establish p er sonal reputation infor mation because the indiv iduals d o not h ave previous knowledge of t he level of t h e oth er's willingn ess to coopera t e. In other words, in such situa tions individuals do not have a 'shadow of the future' (Axelrod 1984) or a ny p ast that h elps t h em d etermine what to exp ect from future interactions. Kollock (1999b) a rgues that r eciprocity in online communication is encouraged when four condition s a r e met: ongoing interaction, identity persisten ce, knowledge of previous inter actions, a nd stron g group bounda ries. W hile individuals may occasionally be purely altruistic, K ollock (1999b) argues that t h is is not a n ecessary assump tion. In particular, som e individuals may j ust want to cooperate out of a sense of self-efficacy, a n expectation of fu ture rewards, or as a way to improv e t h eir own reputation. H owever, when interactions are mostly ra ndom (i. e., identity is not p er sistent), then the last t wo explanat ory fac tor s (i.e., to obtain future r ewards a n d t o attain or pro duce a reput ation) do n ot apply because there is no way to identify oneself to receive r ewards from others and to build a positive reputation.
On the Internet, one type of iterated interaction with rand om par t n ers occurs in peer-to-peer exchange systems. In many popular peer-to-peer systems, individuals decide whether to share digital information goods, or just ta ke such goods from others without sharing in return (Kollock 1999b ). These digital information goods might take the form of digital media such as music or movies, or digital copies of written works such as electronic b ooks or journal articles. Digital goods challenge many for-granted assumptions about the exchange of goods because digital goods can be copied from one person to another (i.e., the original owner does not lose value from the good during the exchan ge) a nd many people can benefit from the digital good without decreasing its value. Kollock (1999b) argues that digital goods produced by a single person on t he Internet can become instant public goods because so many can benefit from t hem. T hese goods are easy to provide partially because they do n ot r equire coordinat ion costs that usually prevent individuals from producing a public good on t h eir own.
The exchange of digital goods in p eer-to-p eer systems can be r epresented as a simple social dilemma in which an act of sharing digital goods is d efined as 'cooperation' and ta king digital goods without sh a ring is defin ed as 'defection'. Individuals can b e thought of as random partners b ecause a given prov ider is d etermined by what a user is looking for in the p eer-to-peer networ k. For exa mple, if a n indiv idual wants to find a specific son g title, when sh e searches for this title she is given a list of individuals who have tha t item and are curren tly sh aring it. Because there are often hundreds of thousands of use rs, and t h ere is no sp ecific reputation informa tion available, each contribut or can be thought of as a r a ndom partner.
When an indiv idual decides to retrieve a digital good from som eone else, how does sh e know that the item w ill b e wh a t the provider says it w ill be? Furthermore, how can the p er son retrieving the d igital good know t hat the item is not a compute r v irus or just bad da ta? In other wor ds, just b ecause an indiv idual shares these goods , does not m ean that sh e is t r ustwor t hy by default. There is some risk involved in downloading a digital good, such as a popula r son g, but the risk may b e ver y small (i.e., involving only the time associa ted with downloading the file in question).
As w ith many types of r eal-world exch a n ge situations , a clear way t o est ablish trustworthiness in a n itera t ed set of online interactions is t hrough r eputation information. As Xiong a nd Liu (2003) argue, trustwor thiness in p eer-to-p eer syste ms can b e d etermined if a transaction-based feedb ack system is used. In their case, a 5-p oint trust model is used t o cr eate re putation scor es t h at help est a blish t rustwor t hiness. While su ch r eputation systems are desirable, they are also not always practical and cannot be used in systems in which users are anonymous, or can easily change their identities (as in m any existing peerto-peer systems). Thus, assuming tha t reputation systems can not be used in iterated interactions a m on g ra ndom partners; individuals must look for oth er d evices for e nsuring trustworthiness or relia bility.
One way individuals infer the trustworthiness of providers without reputational information is by observing how many other people arealso retrieving the digital good from that same provider. Since many peer-to-peer systems (i.e., Kazaa, Morpheus, and the original Napster) allow users to see h ow many other anonymous individuals are retrieving digital goods from any given prov ider, each individual can potentially infer the trustworthiness of t he prov ider from t he actions of others. Such information provides a kind of 'virtual reputation' even if it is not specific enough. Of course, this may essentially be a conformity issue, because individuals may assume that if everyone else 'trusts' the contributor or finds her reliable, the good is probably legitimate. In the absence of personal reputation information, social conformity can end up providing a proxy for t rue reputation information. This type of conformity may r epresent a kind of herd behavior (sometimes seen in investment decisions), when a potentially infin ite set of individuals make a similar decision (Smith/Sorensen 2000) . Individuals who act in this manner do not necessarily ignore personal information. Instead, the behavior of other individuals may be the only information that is available to the individual. If an individual assumes that others may have m ore information than she does, then such 'he rd' behavior is rational.
Another way that individuals can infer the trust wort hiness of a p ot ent ial partner is through a third p arty tha t has already becom e establish ed as trustworthy. A contemporary example would b e when well-known and established companies set up online stores for the buying and selling of used items. Amazon.com, for example, allows individuals to buy and sell used goods directly from their website--yet Amazon.com does not h a ndle the inventory or the actual exchange of used goods. Instead, Amazon.com acts as a reliable or trusted third party intermedia ry tha t m a rkets items for sale, a n d handles t h e collection of payments. Stefik (1999) argues that 'trusted systems' might be a solution to t h e p roblern of establishing confidence in digital goods and media. In this case, a trusted system might work like a bonded carrier , insuring the good and t h ereby reducing the risk tha t individuals face when exchanging digital goods (Lessig 2000) . The key issue is tha t instead of the reputation of the individuals wh o are involved in a given exchange, it is the reputation of the third party t h at establishes t r ustworthiness or reliability. Thus, the risk associated with trusting other individuals is significantly r educed if some third party can eithe r vouch for an individual, or p ossibly even underwrite or gua rantee the transaction. Credit card markets work in this way in the consumer aren a.
Iterated Interactions with Fixed (or Consistent) Partners
Iterated interactions among fixed (or consistent) partners on t h e Internet make up much of the existing research on Internet interactions a nd trust. Online auctions (Kollock 1999a ; Y amagishi/ Ma t suda 2003) and virtual communities (Rheingold 1993; Curtis 1991 ; Abdul-Ra hma n/ Hailes 2000) are oft en characterized by r ep eated interactions with fixed partners. In su ch cases, fixed partners h ave stable identities that allow individuals to h ave repeated interactions t h a t can be compared to previous interactions. As a result, having reputation information is a clear advantage for individuals who want to determ ine t he trustworthiness of partners in such systems (Kollock 1999a; Abdul-Rahman/ Hailes 2000; Yamagishi/ Matsuda 2003) .
An example of evolving virtual communities with iterated interactions among fixed (or consistent) partners is extremely large multiplayer games on t h e Internet. These games involve tens of thousands of players in a persistent on line world. Players fight, trade, talk, and share experiences in t hese vir t u al online worlds. Raph Koster, a game developer for several of t h e world's largest multiplayer games argues that game developers should, "make sure that p layers have a reasonable expectation of future interaction. T h is means persistence of identity and limited mobility." (Koster 2003) The rationale is that players need reputation systems so that they know who they can and cannot t rust. Because computer-mediated exchangestake place without the benefi t of face-to-face communication, it becomes especially difficult for real people t o know h ow h ow much to trust others through digital avatars (i.e., an icon or representation of a real person in a shared virtual world). Citing Yamagishi's a nd Matsuda's (2003) research on positive and n egative r eputation systems, K oster (2003) argues t h at these m assively multiplayer games would be better served with positive reputation systems because, unlike negative reputation system s, t hey promote the p ersistence of identities.
Another example of Internet exch ange with partners w ho a r e fixed (or w ho are at least assumed tobe fixed), a re Usenet n ewsgroups. The Usenet descr ibes a system of organized newsgroups, or bulletin boards, t hat are available t o almost anyone with Internet access. The Usenet does n ot provide assurance of reliability or a uthenticit y-a nyone with an account can p ost to a n ewsgroup und er any name sh e chooses. The stability of on e's identity is often a key p art of on going interactions in these newsgroups. It is argued that stable identities establish a sense of community (Beniger 1987) , grou p affiliation a nd su pp ort (Sproull/ Kiesler 1991; Wellman/G ulia 1999) , as well as t h e basic m otivat ion to actively participa te in ongoing conversations (Donath 1999) .
The unregula t ed n ature of Usen et newsgroups, however, also opens the possibility of identity switching and deception. A s Donath (1999) describes in detail, a Usenet letter posted to any given n ewsgroup is filled w it h oppor tunities for d eception a nd identity fabrication. A reader must ta ke in several clues, including the email address of the sender , the content of the message, t he language and ton e of the m essage, a nd the sign a ture of the sen der. Is a given message really from a doct or if a m essage ab out medical advice is signed 'Dr. Smith'? Is it more or less credible if the supposed doctor's email address is from an official sounding domain? Unfor tunately, t he re is little way t o be sure t h at any message is reliable or legitimate. For example, the account name in the h eader or letterhead can be fake, identity claims can b e completely false, social cu es can be d eliberately misleading or fa ked (see D onath 1999, 44; Gambet ta/ Hamill forthcoming).
Although the kinds of Internet interaction situations described above can be viewed as rep eated interactions w ith fixed p a rtners, it is important to n ote that there are certainly exceptions to all of these examples. In fact, t h ere is at least some research that shows that many types of Internet interaction situations are not always as 'iterated' as we might initially think. In a study on t he quality of online social relationships, Cummings, Butler and Kra ut (2002) sh ow t h a t some kinds of virtual communities such as newsgroups often have very little interactive communication at all b e twee n most members. Among t he newsgroups t h at the researchers examined over a 130-day observation period , over half of the members did not contribute at all, and only a small number of t he m embers contributed the majority of the messages (Cummings/ Butler/ Kraut 2002). So, while these kinds of Internet communities can (and often do) sustain on going interactions between individuals with fixed identities, a substantial number of interactions in these communities may actually consist of one-shot inter actions between individuals who never communicate again.
Experimental Research on Trust and lmplications for
Research on the Internet C urre nt findings in exp erimental studies of trust formation are useful for underst a nding how n etworks of trust can form in computer-mediated syst emssuch as the Interne t. A series of risk taking behaviors is central t o building a trust relation (Blau 1964; Holmes/Rempel 1989) . In a t yp ical trust building scen ario, two people r ealize they can potentially gain from e ngaging in social exch ange. Each p erson knows that sh e will gain from engaging in an exchange with a p ot ential partner if that partnerturnsout tobe trustworthy. However , ther e is not always a way to know if a given partner is act u ally trustwor t hy. On t he Internet, for example, one does not know for certain if the person on e is chatting wit h is w ho they say they a r e (i.e., male or female). Similarly, if two individu als engage in a trade over t h e Internet, t here m ay b e limited assura nces that t h e oth er person w ill h onor the te rms of a trade. Given such a risky situa tion, reputa tion becomes a useful and impor tan t tool for determining the trustwort hiness of another person. This r eputation may come in the form of either experie nce-based informa tion (i.e., past exp eriences w ith this same individual), or third party-referenced information (i. e., reput ation scores assigned by others wh o have inter ac ted with the same individual) as n oted above (Yamagishi/ Matsuda 2003) .
Risk-taking and One-Shot Interactions with Random P artners
If individuals have only one-shot inter actions with on e another and they are always n ew, ra n dom partners, trust cannot emerge. Even r eputa tion information may not be possib le to obtain in such a system because the interactions are always ra ndom. O n e solution is t he use of formal or informal cont rols (Heckathorn 1993 ), yet such controls may n ot be possible eithe r due to the costliness of maintaining t hem , or t h e impracticality of establishing them in open systems like those found on the Interne t. For example, in the earlier example of an unso-licited email request, there are often no informal or formal mechanisms by wh ich monitaring can be provided. This fact makes such interactions highly risky.
In a general study using simulations, Macy /Skvoretz (1998) show t hat COoperation and 'trust' can emerge, despite the lack of formal or info rmal control mechanisms, but only under certain conditions. Although the aut hors use the term 'trust' to refer to the willingness to participate in a r isky activ it y (su ch as playing a PD game with a random partner) , this is better r eferred t o as risktaking behavior (Hardin 2003) rather than trust. This r esearch underscores the importance of distinguishing risk-taking from trusting behav ior, especially in one-shot random partner situations where actual trust-building is not possible.
Macy / Skvoretz (1998) find that the emergence of cooperation among random partners in one-shot interactions ultimately depends on two structural conditions. First, individuals must have the option to not participate (or exit) . Not only does an exit strategy better approximate the real world (since real people often have the ability to not interact at all if they so choose), but it also tends to encourage risk-taking if the option to exit is relatively cost ly.
The second condition they identify is the importance of embedded social networks. Mac y/Skvoretz (1998) demonstrate that cooperation emerges locally among 'neighbors' in an exchange system. In this case, t h e term "neighbors" refers to the proximity of potential interaction pa rtners in t he system . Only after individuals cooperate in these local n etworks does cooperation disseminate through weak n etwork ties. Thus, even if trust is not theoretically possible in t his kind of one-shot ra ndom partner inter action situation, their research sh ows t h at the development of cooperative behavior is still possible u nder certain structural conditions.
Trust-building Among Fixed Partners in Repeated Interactions
In many situa tion s there is often no r egulatory agency to control behav ior and little initial information about the reputations of possible exchange partn ers. Instead, individuals must d etermine the trustworthiness of their p artners through experien ce. The process of building experience-based reputations is itself, risky-b ecause each experience (i. e. interaction) offers a ch a n ce for on e of the partners not to coop e rate, or to b etray the partner's trust. For example, in an online discussion among potential dating partner s, each p erson takes a r isk when they sh are increasingly p er sonal information about t h emselves with the oth er person. Should they r eveal their ages? Should they use their real names? Each d ecision is based on the r esults of previous interactions.
As mentioned above, our r ecent cross-cultural exp erimen ts on t r ust formation in the U .S. and Japa n show tha t coopera tion among individu als is sign ificantly higher w h en indiv iduals are given the opportunity to h ave repeated interactions with fixed partners instead of dealing w ith random partn ers (Cook et al. for thcoming) . We also found that participants significantly entrusted mor e mon ey when t h ey were p aired with fixed p a rtners inst ead of ra n dom partners, and the coop eration rates were also higher w he n they were paired w ith fixed instead of random pa rtners.
In the preceding example, individuals are simply not given t h e opport unity to exit the relationship. So, how does the situation change when indiv iduals interact with a system of participants rather than a set of dyadic relationsh ips? Yamagishi and Matsuda (2003) explore several questions a b out t he t r ustwor thiness of exchange partners in computer-mediated interactions by cr eating an Internet 'auction' in a laboratory setting. The authors find that both experience-based and third-party reputations are successful in promoting t rustwor t hy behavior in an exchange system. 5 However, these reputations are on ly effective so long as the identity of the individuals is permanent. The ability t o change one's identity (a common feature in many forms of exchange on the Internet) , undercuts the effectiveness of reputation systems by allowing individuals to cheat each other and then to start over with a new identity once their reputations become d egraded.
In sum, both experience-based and third-party reputation information are essential for building trust relationships in computer-mediat ed interactions. While such reputation information is clearly important in the r eal world as well, it seems particularly crucial in online interactions that lack many of t he cu es t hat accompany real-world interactions.
Trust-building Among R andom Partners in R epeated Interactions
What if individuals are either randomly match ed or t h eir identities change so that reputation information cannot b e establish ed as with repeated, fixedpartner exchange? When indiv iduals are unable to use experience-based or third-party reputation information to secure their interactions, it becomes particula rly difficult to ascertain the trustworthiness of their partners. And, it is especially difficult to facilita t e the development of trust relationships through risk taking wh en the re is no "shadow of the future" (Axelrod 1984) . Trusting random partners, or those wh o can change t h eir identity, begins to seem more like gambling than rational d ecision making. A ccording to the en capsula ted interest v iew of trust (Hardin 2002) , such beh avior would b e defined as risk-taking, not trust.
Wehave m entioned that peer-to-peer exch a n ge with digital goods represents one kind of Internetexchangesituation wh ere random partners can have r epeated interactions. However, the apparent utopia of cooperative sh aring in peer-t opeer systems may la rgely be artificially created by forcing users to share t h eir own digital goods (Bricklin 2001) . There a r e very real costs (i.e., time, n etwork bandwidth, security) that might lead indiv iduals to r efrain from sharing digital goods if they had the choice. However, all of the most popular online fileswapping systems have this built-in feature: users are not asked whether they want to share their files. Instead, the files are a utomatically shared wh enever som eone downloads a digital good. A s a result, t h e problern of coordinating cooper ation among file-swappers is essentially elimina ted.
If peer-to-peer systems did not artificially create this "cornucopia of the commons" (Bricklin 2001), would individuals stillsharedigital goods? The answer to this question is not yet clear-but the long history of research on public good s and exchange does indicate that individuals do not, on the whole, contribute without some incentive for doing so. One possible m otivation could b e so cial psychological selective incentives tha t further reduce t h e already m in or cost s associated with sharing digital goods (Cheshire 2004) . Selective incentives have been very successful as an economic solution to free riding in t he production of a public good because they offer additional motivations t hat make cooper ation rational even when the initial conditions of the social dilemma make cooperation irrational (e.g., Olson 1965; Oliv er 1980; Hecka thorn 1996) . In dividuals may be encouraged to cooperate (i.e. share digital goods) if t h ey r eceive so cial psychological rewards such as social approval and a sense of gr oup solida rity when they contribute. In an experimental study of digital goo ds exchange, social psychological selective incentives are shown to hav e a significant influence on the likelihood of sharing, despite the costs associated w it h sha ring a nd the lack of any specific reputation information about others (Cheshire 2004) .
In peer-to-peer Internet ex change and other types of sit u ations in which random partners have r ep eated interactions, one of the key problem s is t h e lack of reputation information. However, just because individuals cannot dete rmin e the reputation of a given partner does not m ean that they can not use ot h er information or other tools to try to build trust. For example, we argu e t hat the signaling role of trusting b eh avior is still important for building trust---even when indiv iduals excha n ge with ra ndom partners. By acting in a t r usting m anner , on e can sign al h er intention to coop erate. In a given system , t his a bility to signal ma y b e particula rly noticeable beca use it would b e u nexp ect ed. For exam ple, individuals who would prob a bly prefer to cooperate with an exchange par t n er rat her t h a n t o defect on he r will often defect anyway because t hey expect t h at others are not willing to coopera te. These individuals may d efect simply out of a fear of b eing exploited by others , n ot necessarily b ecause of t h eir own greed (cf. Pruitt/ Kimmel1977; Ya m agish i/Sa to 1986).
Whe n indiv iduals have random p a rtners, the re ca n also b e a kin d of 'secondorder ' fear t h at others will b e similarly fearfvl a nd thus they m igh t defect fo r the same r eason. It is this 'second-order ' fear that trusting beh avior can lessen. For example, if two indiv iduals m eet on a n Int ernet m essage board fo r b ookswapping a nd d ecide to exch a nge b ooks with each other, h ow d o t h ey k now t h at they will each follow up on their agreem ent to m ail the books (e.g ., trust ing b eh avior )? Furt h ermore, h ow can t h ey b e sure that t h e ot her p erson w ill retu rn the b ook w hen they are finished (i.e., co operative b e havior)? W hen on e of t h e individuals sends a book, it acts as a signal to the ot her p erson. By taking a risk and acting in a trusting m a nner , a n individual signals to her p art ner t h at sh e exp ect s cooper a tion, or, that she is not afraid that h er par t n er w ill defect on the exch a n ge. Thus, the act of trusting ma y h elp eliminate this second -order fear in h er partner (see also C ook et al. forthcoming).
In our cross-cultural exp erimen t on trust fo rmation, we found t h at allowing indiv iduals to sign al their trustwor t hiness seems t o h ave a p ositive effect on cooperation, but the effect is small and does not seem to last very lon g . In addition, we found that there is no cross-cultural difference in cooperation between the American and the Japanese participants when they par ticipate in randompartner exchange. Thus, we do not find strong support for t he argum ent that signaling is a mechanism for increasing cooperative behavior and trust in systems with random partners (Cook et al. forthcoming) , b ut this is a fairly hostile environment for trust at the dyadic level. Further research varying the n ature of the situation is needed to assess the importa nce of signaling at t he population level.
Conclusion
Computer-mediated exchanges offer many new ways to look at social exchange and the development of cooperative behavior and trust . Many r ecent exp er imental studies on social exchange networks, uncertainty, commitment and t rust are particularly useful for understanding the ernerging forms of social interaction that exist in computer-mediated situa tions like those found on t he Internet and oth er mediated systems of trade. Since computer-mediated exch anges pr ovide n ew possibilit ies for anonymity in different t ypes of exchan ge sit uations, resolving the uncertainty a nd risk tha t a re created by this a n onym ity is essential for creating ongoing, rela tively secure exch a nge environments . As r ecen t experimental research h as sh own, the developm ent of trust ne twor ks (i.e. networ ks of t h ose one v iews as trustworthy) can h elp r esolve some of t he d ifficulties involved in a nonymaus excha n ges of diffe rent t ypes of goo ds a nd services, but such networ ks h ave relatively high information requirements.
Across the various t ypes of exchange n etworks, r eputational infor mation h as consist ently proven tobe a key factor for establishing cooperation and facilitat ing t h e developm ent of trust. However , other inform ation such as t h e social context , community responsibility norms, or social psychological select ive incen tives can play a n importa nt role in trust-building and insuring r eliability even when p erson al or t hird party reputation information is not available. As exchange on the Internet and other forms of computer-media ted interaction continue to evolve, ongoing exp e rimental research in sociology and related disciplines offers insights into the structural and b eh avior al factors tha t in fluence the d evelopment of trust in t h ese environments. We have affered a classification system that h elps to link t he types of exchange situations that are found in Computermediated systems such as the Internet with the interaction situations that are the subject of much experimental resea rch on cooperation and t r ust formation in the laborator y. Future research on the Internet a nd the man y t ypes of social and econ omic exchanges now being mediated through computerized con nections w ill h elp inform n ot only t h eories of exchange, but also theories of t he role of trust in the econ omy. In this case the r eal world has become t h e la b oratory.
